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Assessing the Meaning of Metaphors in Real-Time: A Cross-Modal Investigation 
Iola Patalas, M.A. 
Concordia University, 2018 
Natural language is replete with figurative expressions such as my lawyer is a shark, and 
listeners are expected to intuitively understand the intended, rather than the literal meaning of 
such expressions. But what are the cognitive resources involved in attaining meaning for such 
sentences? According to proponents of the pragmatic model of metaphor comprehension, 
metaphors are first interpreted literally, and then, upon realizing they cannot be true, listeners 
search for implicatures that could convey the speaker’s intended meaning (Searle, 1979; Grice, 
1989). In contrast, direct-access models of metaphor processing have posited that metaphors can 
be understood directly, circumventing higher-order cognitive processes (e.g. Glucksberg & 
Keysar, 1990). The present thesis investigated these theories using a cross-modal lexical decision 
paradigm (Swinney, 1979) with a novel brief masked target presentation at two probe points, in 
order to assess the moment-by-moment on-line processes involved in metaphor comprehension. 
We predicted that, following the pragmatic model, literally related target words would yield 
greater priming effects at the vehicle (e.g., shark) recognition point (a), compared to figurative 
targets, in both metaphor and simile conditions. At the later probe point (b), 500 ms after the 
vehicle’s recognition point, we expected that figurative targets would yield greater priming 
effects during metaphor comprehension as literal meanings were discarded. Results obtained 
from a preliminary sample demonstrated priming of related target words across conditions, but 
no significant differences between conditions. We discuss how these results may best be 
interpreted as supporting the dual-processing account of metaphor interpretation put forth by 
iv 
 
Carston (2010), which suggests that metaphors are held in the mind as literally true even as fast 
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Assessing the Meaning of Metaphors in Real-Time: A Cross-Modal Investigation 
Are lawyers sharks? On the surface, the answer to this question is self-evidently 'no' - 
lawyers (human beings belonging to a certain profession) cannot, logically, be large carnivorous 
fish. However, a reader with a certain experience of lawyers might be tempted to answer yes to 
this question, because most readers will understand the question was not meant literally. Natural 
language is replete with figurative language, and listeners are expected to intuitively understand 
the intended, rather than the literal meaning of such expressions – but what are the cognitive 
resources involved in attaining meaning for such sentences? How and why people interpret 
nonliteral utterances as meaningful is a question essential to the understanding of language, and 
a subject of debate among cognitive scientists. 
Metaphor Versus Simile 
 Nominal metaphors in the form X is Y (e.g. lawyers are sharks) are traditionally thought 
to be an alternate form of the simile (e.g. lawyers are like sharks), which involve direct 
comparisons in the form X is like Y – a view dating back to Aristotle (trans. 1926). Both these 
forms imply a relationship between a topic (lawyers) and a vehicle (sharks) that depends on 
listener interpretation to be fully understood. In both cases, a listener's interpretation of the 
comparison likely relies on identifying features of the vehicle that could plausibly be applied to 
the topic – for instance, sharks are often thought to be aggressive and predatory, features which 
could also be attributed to certain lawyers. 
 The key difference between these two forms of expression is a word such as like in 
simile, which renders the simile literally comprehensible – after all, it is always possible for one 
thing to be like another in some way. In contrast, a nominal metaphor does not explicitly invite a 




superordinate category encompassing the topic, or predicates something about the topic, as in the 
sentence lawyers are people. The listener's assumption that a sentence with the structure X is Y is 
a categorical statement denoting a superordinate category falls apart upon hearing a seemingly 
anomalous vehicle like sharks, but this generally does not make a metaphor incomprehensible, 
even though it is literally impossible. 
 The purpose of the present thesis is to investigate the nature of the representations 
computed during the real-time processing of metaphors and similes. Specifically, we aimed to 
compare these two types of expression in real time to elucidate differences in processing that 
might occur due to their fundamentally metaphorical and literal nature, respectively, and by 
doing so to shed light on the cognitive mechanisms involved in reaching an understanding of the 
intended meaning of such constructions. 
Pragmatic Theory of Metaphor Comprehension  
 Various theories have arisen to account for how listeners derive meaning from metaphors 
of the X is Y form. Early theories suggested that metaphors are first interpreted literally, and then, 
upon realizing they cannot be literally true, listeners will search for alternate meanings (Grice, 
1975; Searle, 1979). According to Searle (1979), literal utterances denote a set of truth 
conditions that are applicable only in a certain context that is agreed upon implicitly by the 
speaker and listener of a sentence. Thus, a sentence like “Sally is tall” is true only insofar as the 
referent for tallness is other women, and not, e.g., giraffes – but as long as the speakers share the 
same referent, no additional information is needed to interpret a literal statement (Searle, 1979). 
In contrast, Searle (1979) posited that in order to search for an appropriate utterance meaning for 
a metaphor, a listener must first fully process a sentence and find it “defective” relative to these 




have in common. Here Searle (1979) makes a distinction between sentence meaning (that is, the 
literal denotative meaning where sharks really means SHARKS), and utterance meaning (what 
the speaker might have intended to convey by the phrase) (p. 84). He proposes a three-step 
process involved in communicating the speaker's utterance meaning to a listener that involves 
first fully processing the literal, semantic meaning of the sentence, then using surrounding 
context to determine its truth value, and finally, upon finding some truth condition lacking, 
searching for alternative, figurative meanings (Searle, 1979). This theory of metaphor 
interpretation is commonly referred to as the pragmatic model.  
 Another pragmatic theory which deviates slightly from Searle's (1978) model was 
proposed by Davidson (1978). Davidson's (1978) model proposed that, rather than being 
understood strictly by their propositional content, metaphors invite a reader to imagine them as 
true: “A picture is not worth a thousand words, or any other number. Words are the wrong 
currency to exchange for a picture” (Davidson, 1978, p. 263). However, for the purposes of our 
comparison, we propose there is no significant distinction between envisioning a lawyer as a 
shark and interpreting that the lawyer is literally a shark in a semantic sense – both processes 
involve interpreting the referent shark literally prior to accessing the pragmatic system for 
alternate potential meanings. Indeed, Davidson (1978) describes this process thus: “Absurdity or 
contradiction in a metaphorical sentence guarantees we won’t believe it and invites us, under 
proper circumstances, to take the sentence metaphorically” (p. 42).  
 Before we move on, it is relevant to make note of the difference between semantic and 
pragmatic processes generally. A distinction between these two processes in the linguistic 
context is made by de Almeida and Lepore (2018) in their discussion on linguistic modularity. 




architecture is merely symbolic, allowing for fast computations to be made in the linguistic 
system (de Almeida & Lepore, 2018). This semantic output is necessarily separate from the 
enriched understanding of a sentence which arises after drawing upon other cognitive systems 
such as memory, world knowledge, etc. - what we refer to here as the pragmatic system. Thus, 
the surface structure of a sentence, referred to by de Almeida & Lepore (2018) as a “shallow” 
representation (p. 115), is merely the output of linguistic computations performed on symbolic 
aspects of language, and this representation does not automatically draw upon deeper or more 
nuanced potential sentence meanings. According to this theory, there is no way for the linguistic 
system to automatically (or directly) access all the connotations of shark as these deeper 
understandings rely on the pragmatic system. 
Direct-Access Accounts of Metaphor Comprehension 
 Most modern studies on metaphor have rejected the pragmatic model, suggesting instead 
that metaphors are immediately comprehensible by the linguistic system and do not involve 
additional cognitive resources to process compared to literal statements (e.g. Glucksberg & 
Keysar, 1990; Gibbs, 1994; Wolff & Gentner, 2000). This can be explained by a mechanism 
where metaphors are taken as comparisons between categories (e.g. Glucksberg & Keysar, 1990; 
Glucksberg, 2003), or processed via mapping common word properties, or constituent features, 
which are stored in the linguistic system as lexical properties of individual words (Wolff & 
Gentner, 2000). The comparison theory proposed by Glucksberg and Keysar (1990) postulates 
that in a phrase such as my job is a jail, a jail could be interpreted as shorthand for a 
superordinate category denoting an unpleasant or involuntary situation to which a job could also 
plausibly belong. Thus, according to this theory, the vehicle in a metaphor takes on the function 




and Gentner (2000) rejected the idea that metaphor processing is directional (i.e. a 
superordinate/subordinate relationship between vehicle and topic), instead proposing that 
metaphors are processed via alignment of “salient properties” common to topic and vehicle, both 
figurative and literal. Along the same lines, the graded salience theory developed by Giora 
(2003) claims that a listener chooses between a number of initially available interpretations of a 
sentence based on properties like familiarity and aptness.  
Dual Processing Model of Metaphor Comprehension 
 What about situations that involve mixed metaphors, or long passages involving multiple 
layers of metaphor? Building on her interpretation of Davidson's (1978) model of metaphor as 
evoking images, Carston (2010) argues that there are two simultaneous processes driving 
metaphor comprehension in real-time: (1) A process of ad-hoc interpretation where a listener 
treats metaphors as propositional content and adjusts the understanding of each metaphor using 
pragmatic processes to understand individual metaphorical meanings; (2) a process wherein a 
listener simultaneously keeps the literal semantic meaning of metaphorical phrases in mind to 
facilitate ongoing understanding of speaker meaning. An example is given by Carston (2010) to 
demonstrate why this would intuitively be true: when hearing a construction such as (1a), many 
listeners would be confused by the concept of watering a spark, even though individually the 
two halves of the mixed metaphor are clearly understandable (Carston, 2010; p. 305). 
 (1) a. If you find a student with a spark of imagination, water it. (Tirrell, 1989) 
In this case, no cognitive dissonance would be experienced by a listener if each metaphor were 
interpreted separately using pragmatic processes after rejection of literal, semantic 
representations. Thus Carston (2010) concludes that literal interpretations likely persist after they 




it is possible that the surface meaning is the only meaning initially accessed, while both surface 
and contextual meanings remain simultaneously accessible after pragmatic processes kick in. 
Evidence Against the Direct-Access Model 
 According to Glucksberg (2003), “there is a consensus in the field that literal meaning 
does not have unconditional priority” over figurative meanings (p. 92) and thus figurative 
meanings of an utterance can be accessed directly by the linguistic system, although the 
consensus does not extend to the mechanism by which meaning is attained. However, this view 
is most often based on the fact that tests involving comprehension are usually offline, i.e., require 
conscious judgment, and are thus not informative regarding what happens as sentences 
containing metaphors unfold in real time. For instance, Glucksberg, Gildea, and Bookin (1982) 
asked participants to read literal and metaphorical sentences and to judge whether they were 
literally true or literally false. Based on a finding that it took longer for participants to judge 
statements as false if they had a common metaphorical interpretation (e.g. jobs are jails), the 
authors concluded that a metaphorical meaning is immediately available along with a literal 
meaning and thus interfered with subjects' classification of metaphorical sentences as literally 
false (Glucksberg et al., 1982). This result has been widely replicated since, using similar offline 
judgment tasks about various metaphor configurations (e.g. Keysar, 1989; Wolff & Gentner, 
2000). It would be premature, however, to conclude that these differences in reading time are 
necessarily caused by automatic metaphor processing by the linguistic system, as an offline 
judgment task does not provide any evidence about what is actually happening as readers process 
sentences in real time. The results obtained by offline studies such as Glucksberg and colleagues' 
(1982) could be equally compatible with the hypothesis that pragmatic processes interfere with 





 Eye-tracking studies measuring reading times are also frequently invoked as evidence for 
the automatic processing of metaphors (e.g. Ortony, Schallert, Reynolds & Antos, 1978; Inhoff, 
Lima & Carroll, 1984). Inhoff and colleagues (1984) manipulated the length of contexts 
preceding short metaphorical statements and found that a short metaphor-biasing context such as 
(2a) was processed more slowly than a literal-biasing context such as (2b). When longer context 
was given, no significant difference in reading time was found between metaphor-biasing and 
literal-biasing contexts (2c-d) (Inhoff et al. 1984).  
 (2) a.  At a meeting of the women's club, the hens clucked noisily. 
  b. In the back of the barn, the hens clucked noisily. 
  c. At a meeting of the women's club the youngest member requested the floor and 
  brought up the issue of supporting the equal rights amendment. The importance of 
  the issue outweighed her discomfort in speaking before the roup. They reacted as 
  she expected. The hens clucked noisily. 
  d. In the back of the barn, the farmer's youngest child gathered pebbles and  
  skipped them  deftly across a puddle by the chicken coop. He knew that he was  
  supposed to be feeding the animals but he kept on flicking at the birds. The hens  
  clucked noisily.  
While Inhoff and colleagues (1984) interpreted this result to mean that sufficient biasing context 
can enable direct processing of a metaphor in the linguistic system, alternate explanations for 
this finding have been proposed as equally plausible. De Almeida, Manouilidou, Roncero and 
Riven (2010) argued that these results could be consistent with the pragmatic model of metaphor 




(figurative) meanings once the literal meaning of a sentence is rejected, compared to a short or 
uninformative biasing context. Context could lead to insignificant differences in overall reading 
time by making pragmatic cognitive processes much faster, not necessarily by circumventing 
them entirely. Studies directly comparing reading times for simile and metaphor have found that 
metaphors take longer to read relative to similes (e.g. Janus & Bever, 1985). In a more recent 
eye-tracking study comparing nominal metaphors such as knowledge is a river to their 
corresponding similes (knowledge is like a river), Ashby, Roncero, de Almeida and Agauas 
(2018) found longer reading times for the vehicle word (e.g. river) in metaphors compared to 
similes. Participants in this study also regressed from the vehicle region more when reading 
metaphors than when reading similes (Ashby et al., 2018), suggesting that readers had more 
initial difficulty processing metaphorical, compared to literal, statements immediately upon 
encountering the vehicle word.  
 It should be noted that metaphors are not all processed equally easily. Reversing the topic 
and vehicle in nominal metaphors – for example, changing some jobs are jails to some jails are 
jobs - can impede full comprehension by readers, although this transformation does not 
significantly alter the time it takes to make literality judgments (Wolff & Gentner, 2000). More 
importantly, metaphor processing can be facilitated by properties such as aptness and familiarity. 
Aptness, which describes the extent to which a vehicle's properties encompass salient features of 
the topic, has been found to mediate a preference for metaphor over simile (Chiappe, Kennedy & 
Chiappe, 2003; Roncero, de Almeida, Martin & de Caro, 2016), and ease metaphor processing 
(Bowdle & Gentner, 2005). Highly familiar metaphors, but not unfamiliar metaphors, primed 
figurative meanings in a cross-modal lexical priming study (Blasko & Connine, 1993) and were 




Hauser, Baum & Titone, 2015). Furthermore, Columbus et al. (2015) found a relationship 
between executive control and comprehension of unfamiliar metaphors, concluding that 
interpretation of novel metaphors relies upon pragmatic processes to come up with possible 
figurative meanings. This difference could be due to a process wherein highly conventional 
metaphors become lexicalized, like common idioms, and can be easily retrieved from memory. 
Searle (1979) refers to these as 'dead metaphors' (p. 110) – explaining that in some cases, the 
meaning of a figurative phrase can eventually become so common that it effectively functions as 
a literal expression denoting the intended meaning. However, Ashby et al. (2018) found that 
moderately familiar, highly apt metaphors were still processed with more difficulty than similes 
containing the same topic-vehicle pair.  
 Studies investigating on-line metaphor processing by measuring event-related potentials 
(ERP) have demonstrated that figurative targets elicited larger N400 amplitudes than literal 
targets (e.g. Pynte, Besson, Robichon & Poli, 1996; Lai, Curran, & Menn, 2009), which suggests 
that figurative language is more difficult to process. This could be due to the detection of an 
incongruence between literal and intended speaker meaning. However, ERP is flawed due to the 
low ecological validity of timed serial target presentation, compared to self-paced reading. 
Furthermore, relatively few studies have investigated metaphor in auditory speech contexts, with 
most studies on metaphor restricted to reading contexts. In light of this mixed evidence, and 
dearth of studies investigating the moment-by-moment cognitive processes during metaphor 
listening and reading, it is too early to conclude that the debate about how metaphor 
interpretation occurs (i.e., directly or via a two-stage, semantics-then-pragmatics process) is 
settled, or a matter of consensus as Glucksberg (2003) claims.  




interpretation is the mechanism which allows listeners to access alternative meanings of the 
vehicle – whether they be taxonomic categories or constituent features implied by the vehicle 
itself. The question remains: how exactly do listeners understand what is meant by sharks while 
bypassing any consideration of sharks themselves? It is easy enough to imagine that upon 
hearing a dead metaphor such as “a warm welcome” (Searle, 1979, p. 98), where even 
dictionaries have come to associate warmth with meanings other than a certain temperature 
range, listeners may have direct access to this alternate meaning of “warm” in an appropriate 
context. But in novel metaphors, speakers have only the real meaning of the vehicle as a referent 
from which to glean possible figurative meanings. After all, as demonstrated by open-ended 
norming studies such as Roncero and de Almeida (2015), when listeners are asked to identify 
constituent features which link topic and vehicle in a metaphorical context, there is only a loose 
consensus between listeners about the words that exemplify this relationship. It is unlikely that 
all English speakers hold the same set of associations with a word like sharks – or, indeed, 
lawyers – such that they do not need to refer to their real-world knowledge about sharks and 
lawyers to arrive at the most salient figurative meaning of lawyers are sharks. 
 Defenders of the pragmatic theory claim that there is a moment during processing – 
however brief – where sharks really does mean sharks, the fish. Furthermore, this can be argued 
to be essential to access appropriate alternative understandings of a metaphor.  Lepore and Stone 
(2014) point out that saying lawyers are sharks is essentially different than saying lawyers are 
like sharks in that it invites the listener to actually imagine lawyers as sharks rather than simply 
comparing their similarities. This process of imagining, or accessing imagery, may explain why 
simile and metaphor do not call to mind identical associations in readers (e.g. Roncero & de 




contexts. Theorists arguing that figurative meanings are accessed automatically have yet to 
explain how a listener hearing the word shark would even know to reject its literal meaning, if as 
they claim this literal meaning is not accessed at all during sentence processing. Is it possible 
that the word shark does not directly correspond to the concept of a shark in our mental lexicon?  
 In order to resolve the conflict in the literature between pragmatic and direct-access 
models of metaphor processing, it is first necessary to gain insight into exactly what happens the 
very moment a reader or listener encounters a vehicle intended to convey a figurative meaning. 
To our knowledge, no studies have actually investigated what sort of information is accessed in 
the moment-by-moment process of spoken comprehension of metaphors and similes using the 
same topic and vehicle. According to the various semantic (direct-access) models of metaphor 
processing, listeners should have immediate access to the figurative meaning of both similes and 
metaphors upon hearing the vehicle – possibly to the exclusion of literal meanings – and the 
preference for this interpretation should not change over time. The goal of this research is to test 
the alternate hypothesis, consistent with the pragmatic model of metaphor processing that 
listener interpretation of a metaphor does change over time, with an initial full processing of the 
literal sentence meaning of a metaphor eventually leading to a figurative understanding. 
The Present Study 
 The aim of this study was to test what types of interpretations are accessed at the moment 
the vehicle is first recognized in both metaphor and simile, as well as in the moments after when 
comprehension of utterance meaning has been reached. We sought to compare the moment-by-
moment comprehension of nominal metaphors in the form X is Y and similes in the form X is like 
Y using a cross-modal lexical decision task (CMLD; Swinney, 1979). In this task, participants 




visual target to perform a lexical decision task (i.e., pressing “yes” if the target is a word, “no” 
otherwise) in which response times (RTs) are collected. The main assumption behind the 
technique is that RTs to targets reflect the relation between a visual target and a prime word in 
the sentence (here, the vehicle Y). Specifically, recognition of the target word should be 
facilitated by hearing a related prime word, and thus yield a faster reaction time compared to a 
target that is semantically unrelated.  
 For this CMLD task, we employed aurally presented sentences containing metaphors or 
similes with the same constituents (except for like in similes), following a natural speech rhythm. 
Our visual targets were either: a word related to a literal meaning of the vehicle, a word related 
to the metaphorical meaning of the vehicle, or one of two frequency- and length-matched 
controls used to calculate priming effects (priming = RT(control) - RT(target)). We employed two 
probe points (i.e., when targets appear on the screen relative to the speech stream): (a) 
recognition point of the vehicle (determined by a gating paradigm; Zwitserlood, 1989), and (b) 
500ms following recognition of the vehicle, to allow for sentence comprehension to occur. 
Metaphors, similes, and target words were selected from Roncero and de Almeida (2015), which 
obtained norms for properties like aptness, familiarity and conventionality. We selected primarily 
novel metaphors with high aptness but a range of familiarity ratings.  
 The rationale for this methodology is as follows: first, listening to spoken metaphors in 
an on-line lexical decision task allows for an analysis of metaphor interpretation that is both 
highly time-sensitive and naturalistic. Using a simple lexical decision task rather than an off-line 
judgment task means that participants do not base their responses on a conscious assessment of 
sentence meaning – indeed, they are not aware that this task is meant to test their comprehension 




that is available at the moment visual targets are presented. Second, using similes as literal 
controls allows for all constituent words besides like (including target and vehicle) to remain 
identical, thus allowing for direct comparisons between literal and figurative interpretations of 
each topic-vehicle pair. A possible criticism of this approach is that similes are typically classed 
as figurative language, but as argued in the preceding paragraphs, similes differ from metaphors 
in that they remain literally comprehensible as comparison statements. Thus, according to the 
three-step model of metaphor processing detailed by Searle (1979), similes should not be 
identified as defective in a literal sense upon recognition of the vehicle. 
 Following the pragmatic model, we hypothesized that targets corresponding to the literal 
meaning of the vehicle word would yield greater priming effects at recognition point (a), 
compared to figurative targets. This should be true for both metaphor and simile if the denotative 
meaning of the vehicle is the only meaning initially accessed. At the later probe point (b), we 
expected that figurative targets would yield greater priming effects during metaphor 
comprehension as literal meanings were discarded. In contrast, we predicted that RTs for literal 
targets during simile comprehension will continue to be lower at this later probe point (b), since 
similes are comprehensible literally and literal meanings should not necessarily be discarded.  
 Alternatively, if metaphors are automatically processed using all possible constituent 
word properties, as suggested by Wolff & Gentner (2000), priming effects for figurative targets 
as well as literal targets should be seen immediately at recognition point (a). Since a direct-
access account of metaphor processing suggests metaphor should be no more difficult to process 
than simile, according to this model no difference in priming effect should be apparent between 
metaphor and simile conditions at either time point, and literally related targets should generally 





Priming effects predicted for the conditions employed in the present study, according to different 
metaphor processing models. 
Model  Metaphor  Simile 
 
 
 (a) Early (b) Late  (a) Early (b) Late 
  
 
Literal Figurative Literal Figurative  Literal Figurative Literal Figurative 
  
 
         
Pragmatic  strong weak/none weak strong  strong weak/none strong weak 
  
 




strong strong weak strong  strong strong weak strong 
  
 




strong strong strong strong  strong strong strong strong 






full list of predictions, refer to Table 1). To our knowledge, no other study has investigated on-
line metaphor processing using this method in order to test specific predictions of the pragmatic 




 Participants were recruited from Concordia University using the Psychology Participant 
Pool and from surrounding communities using posters and online advertisements. All 
participants completed a pre-screening language questionnaire which assessed their language 
background, self reported verbal and written fluency, and learning disabilities. Based on their 
questionnaire responses, we selected 37 native English speakers between the ages of 19 and 59 
(M=26.32, SD=8.07; 26F) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision and hearing who met the 
following inclusion criteria: (1) They learned English before the age of 5 (M=1.19, SD=1.47) and 
identified it as their native and dominant language; (2) they rated themselves as fluent in 
speaking, listening, and reading English; (3) they reported no history of hearing or reading 
disability. Participants who were recruited via the Concordia participant pool were compensated 
with course credit while all other participants were compensated with $10 CAD for one hour of 
participation. Participants for two pretests are described along with the pretests below.  
Materials  
 Experimental materials consisted of 32 sentences containing metaphors/similes in the 
form X is (like) Y and 160 filler sentences. Metaphor/simile sentences were selected from 




accompanying norms. The sentences we selected from this set of norms were chosen on the basis 
of their high aptness ratings (rated above 6 on a scale of 1 to 10, with 10 being the most apt), but 
had a broad range of familiarity ratings. The Roncero and de Almeida (2015) norming study 
asked participants to generate associates/explanatory words for both the simile and metaphor 
versions of each sentence and for the topic and vehicle words in isolation. For use as our 
figuratively related targets, we selected explanatory words generated for each metaphor by the 
highest possible number of participants, which did not appear as associates for the vehicle word 
in isolation. For our literally related targets, we selected words which were generated as 
associates of the vehicle word by the highest possible number of participants and which did not 
appear as explanatory words for the metaphor on the whole (see Appendix for sentences and 
related targets).  
Exclusion of automatic associates. To ensure that any potential priming effects were not 
derived from an 'automatic' association between the vehicle and target words (i.e., due to being 
frequently paired in speech, like 'salt and pepper'), we conducted a norming experiment where 
each vehicle word was read aloud to 12 native speakers of English, who were asked to say the 
first word that comes to mind out loud. Their responses were collected and any word which was 
named more than twice was excluded from selection as a target for that vehicle word.  
The unrelated control words selected to calculate priming effects were chosen according 
to the following criteria. For each related target word, written frequency was calculated from the 
Corpus of Contemporary American English (COCA), a database of American English texts 
collected from 1990-2017 including fiction, non-fiction and academic texts. Matched (unrelated) 
control words were selected to have the same number of letters, same number of syllables, same 




Sentence recording and targets. Metaphors/similes were embedded in longer sentences 
with explanatory contexts which we generated, with the word 'because' following each vehicle 
word to control for interference from explanatory contexts. Filler sentences did not repeat the 
topic or vehicle words of any experimental sentences. Of these, 32 followed a similar sentence 
structure as experimental sentences, while 128 filler sentences did not syntactically resemble 
experimental sentences. Visual targets for filler sentences were 64 real English words and 96 
‘nonsense’ strings of letters that did not resemble English words, of varied lengths to reflect the 
varied lengths of experimental targets. All sentences were read by a female native English 
speaker and recorded for aural presentation, with natural prosody and reading speed. Special 
attention was given to matching the prosody and timing of metaphor and simile pairs, to make 
them nearly identical except for the word ‘like.’   
Recognition Times. We employed a gating paradigm to determine the recognition point 
of each vehicle word, following the procedure developed by Zwitserlood (1989). Recordings of 
each vehicle word were cut into slices increasing by 50ms each. These were played 
consecutively to 10 native speakers of English over noise canceling headphones. Participants 
were asked to write down what word they thought they were hearing after each slice was 
presented. Their responses were collected and recognition times for each word were defined as 
the moment when 80 percent of participants correctly identified the word (with or without 
pluralization). During the lexical decision task, the early time point was defined as 40ms prior to 
recognition time, to account for screen refresh rate and the fact that the word could have become 
recognizable anytime within the 50ms slice participants heard during the gating task. Late time 
points were defined as 500ms following recognition time to avoid interference from words later 





 To avoid repeating experimental sentences, 16 counterbalanced lists were created 
following a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 design. Each topic/vehicle pair was presented in either a metaphor- or 
simile-containing sentence, along with a figuratively related target, literal target or matched 
control target, at an early (recognition) or late time point. Each block contained two experimental 
sentences in each condition along with all 160 filler sentences, 20 of which were followed by 
comprehension questions to ensure participants were attending to aural stimuli. Each participant 
completed two blocks containing one list each – i.e., each participant heard both the simile and 
metaphor version of each sentence once in total. The sentences were randomized in order within 
each block of trials and participants were randomly assigned to each set of lists. Due to an error 
in coding which was later fixed, some participants did not see all sentences in each list, and thus 
3-7 data points are missing for many of the participants.  
Procedure 
 Participants were tested on an iMac flatscreen computer using Psyscope X B57 (Cohen, 
MacWhinney, Flatt, & Provost, 1993) using a button box. After voluntary consent was obtained, 
each participant was seated in front of the screen in a dark room, equipped with noise-cancelling 
headphones, and instructed to attend to both the aurally presented sentences and visual stimuli on 
the screen. Participants were instructed that their primary task was to identify whether the letters 
they saw on the screen constituted an English word and to press a button to indicate YES or NO 
as quickly and accurately as possible, while their secondary task was to answer comprehension 
questions about the sentences they heard over the headphones.  
 Each trial consisted of a prompt asking participants to press a button when they were 




Figure 1.  Time-course of events in each experimental trial. Two experimental probe points were 
used with this figure showing only the recognition point and not the late time point. Durations 




words appeared in white 20-point Arial font text in capital letters on a black screen for 80ms 
each, preceded and followed by masks which appeared for 100ms. This brief masked priming 
procedure was meant to reflect faster and more automatic processes of recognition rather than 
slower processes of judgment. Masked priming (see: Forster, 1999) reflects early processes of 
lexical recognition which should be uncontaminated by other semantic factors. Each participant 
was given five randomized practice trials, during which the experimenter answered questions 
and corrected mistakes.  
Results 
 The main purpose of our analysis was to investigate priming effects, defined as the 
difference between unrelated and related (literal and figurative) visually presented targets, in 
both metaphor and simile conditions, and at both time points in order to investigate potential 
differences in priming effects between conditions.  
Data Analysis 
 Analysis of reaction times (RTs) was restricted to correct trials (i.e., those where 
participants correctly identified the target as an English word) while incorrect trials were omitted 
(13% of all data points). As is standard in lexical decision paradigms (Friedmann, Taranto, 
Shapiro & Swinney, 2008), all reaction times above 2 seconds were discarded prior to data 
analysis (2% of all data points). Based on a priori decisions, we discarded blocks of trials where 
participants answered fewer than 70% of comprehension questions correctly (as in Friedmann et 







Figure 2. Mean RTs in Metaphor and Simile conditions as a function of time point and literality 




Figure 3. Mean priming effects between unmatched control words and related target words in 





presented sentences; blocks where participants answered fewer than 60% of trials correctly; and 
participants whose mean RTs were more than 3 standard deviations away from the overall mean 
(following Friedmann et al., 2008). To correct for positive skew, RTs that deviated more than +/-
2 standard deviations from the mean were replaced with values 2 standard deviations from the 
mean prior to analysis. A visual inspection of the data confirmed that the data met assumptions 
of homoscedasticity but violated assumptions of normality. However, we chose to analyse raw 
RT scores rather than log or square root transformed data due to concerns that raw scores would 
be more informative about cognitive processes occurring during comprehension and transformed 
data can distort this data and make it more difficult to interpret (Lo & Andrews, 2015). All 
analyses were performed using the 'lme4' package (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015) in 
R (R Core Team, 2015).  
Results 
 We performed a linear mixed-effects model regression analysis with subjects and items 
(vehicles) entered as random effects with random intercepts. Raw RTs were regressed on priming 
(control/experimental targets), sentence literality (metaphor/simile conditions), target type 
(figurative/literal) and time-point (early/late), as well as all first order interaction terms. For ease 
of interpretation, mean response times for each condition (and SEM) are presented in Figure 2. 
Priming effects are presented in Figure 3. The full RT model was compared to a null model 
including only random effects (subject and item), using the Likelihood Ratio Test to determine 
significance. Our model provided a better fit to the data than the null model (χ2(10) = 25.70, p = 
0.004). We derived p-values for all main effects and interactions using the Likelihood Ratio Test 
to compare the full model to a model excluding the relevant term (see Table 2) and found only 





 Mixed-effects linear model of response times. 
Predictor Estimate SE t 95% CI Null Comparison 
Constant 718.19 23.88 30.08 [671.39, 765.00]  
Priming -39.51 16.10 -2.45 [-71.06, -7.95] χ 2(4)=22.38, p<.001 
Time-point -1.84 16.05 -0.11 [-33.29, 29.61] χ 2(4)=1.67, p=.80 
Target type -16.44 16.15 -1.02 [-48.10, 15.22] χ 2(4)=1.27, p=.87 
Sentence literality -18.04 16.02 -1.13 [-49.44, 13.37] χ 2(4)=2.31, p=.68 
Priming x Time-point 1.43 15.81 0.09 [-29.55, 32.40] χ 2(1)=0.0083, p=.93 
Priming x Target type 8.09 15.87 0.51 [-23.02, 39.19] χ 2(1)=0.26, p=.61 
Priming x Sentence literality -4.50 15.83 -0.28 [-35.52, 26.52] χ 2(1)=0.08, p=.78 
Time-point x Target type 2.01 15.78 0.13 [-28.93, 32.94] χ 2(1)=0.02, p=.90 
Time-point x Sentence literality 14.28 15.77 0.91 [-16.64, 45.19] χ 2(1)=0.82, p=.36 






 As predicted, participants took significantly longer to respond to unrelated targets than to 
related targets (χ2(4) = 22.38, p < 0.001) – overall, RTs to related targets were 40ms faster 
(SEM=23.88). While no other main terms or interaction terms reached significance, the 
respective means of each condition seemed to show trends which may be worth investigating 
with a larger sample. Specifically, in the metaphor condition, early priming values were lower 
for the figurative condition than for the literal condition, but priming for the figurative condition 
was higher at the later time point. In the simile condition, the reverse was true, with higher 
priming for literal targets at the late time point. Unexpectedly, the largest priming effect was 
observed for figuratively related targets at the early time point of the simile condition. 
Discussion 
 Various theories have been proposed to account for how metaphors are understood. While 
early scholarly works on metaphor comprehension (what we have called pragmatic theories of 
metaphor processing) proposed that figurative sentences trigger “implicatures” (Grice, 1975) 
which allow a listener to understand a speaker's intended meaning from a literally false 
proposition (see: Grice, 1975; Davidson, 1978; Searle, 1979), more recent attempts to explain 
metaphor have assumed that figurative language is automatically understood as metaphorical. 
Proponents of direct-access models of metaphor comprehension (e.g., Gibbs, 1994; Wolff & 
Gentner, 2000; Glucksberg, 2003) have presented various accounts of strategies which would 
allow direct access to intended metaphorical meanings by the linguistic system, without drawing 
upon more nuanced pragmatic systems – what these accounts all have in common is the 
assumption that metaphorical meaning is directly accessed. However, empirical evidence given 
in support of this assumption has mainly been restricted to off-line judgment tasks (e.g., 




involvement of time-consuming pragmatic processes.  
 The goal of the present thesis was to gain insight into the moment-by-moment processing 
of metaphors and similes in the form X is Y/X is like Y by employing a time-sensitive cross-
modal lexical decision paradigm. Following the pragmatic model, we hypothesized that 
recognition of target words would be facilitated (in both metaphor and simile conditions) at the 
recognition point (a) of an aurally presented vehicle word that was literally related, resulting in 
priming effects; however, we expected to see minimal priming effects for figuratively related 
target words at recognition point (a), as we hypothesized metaphorical meanings would not yet 
be accessible at the earliest stages of processing. Conversely, at the later time point (b), we 
hypothesized that priming effects would be larger for figuratively related targets than literally 
related targets in the metaphor condition, while literally related targets would continue to show 
priming effects in the simile condition (for a full list of predictions, see Table 1). The results 
obtained showed significant priming in all conditions and at all time points, but, contrary to our 
hypothesis, no statistically significant differences in priming between conditions were obtained.  
 This result can be interpreted as in part compatible with direct-access models of metaphor 
processing, as figurative targets were primed early on in both conditions. However, contrary to 
what both pragmatic and direct-access models would predict, literally related target words were 
still primed as much as the later time point (b) as at point (a), suggesting that even after a 
sentence has been fully processed (and, presumably, understood to have a non-literal intended 
meaning), literal representations of the vehicle word remain activated within the cognitive 
system. An account of metaphor processing that would best explain this result is the dual-
processing model proposed by Carston (2010). According to the dual-processing model, two 




line formation of ad-hoc concepts linked to the metaphorical vehicle (for example, while the 
lexical item shark may conceptually represent the fish, it may also represent a concept like 
aggressive, especially for highly lexicalized metaphors like many of those used in our 
experiment), and a more nuanced, off-line process of interpreting the meaning of a metaphorical 
passage that relies on its literal meaning and the images the literal meaning evokes (Carston, 
2010). Thus, according to Carston's (2010) model, the early priming of figuratively related 
targets presented at recognition point (a) could be a result of ad-hoc concept formation relating 
the vehicle word to figurative concepts, while the persistence of priming for literally related 
targets at point (b) could be explained by the persistent, simultaneous activation of literal 
representations.  
 A notable result was the lack of difference between similes (which we took to be literal) 
and metaphors. According to Carston’s (2010) model, ad-hoc concepts are created for metaphors 
in order to make their intended meaning comprehensible, but this might not be necessary for 
similes, which are literally comprehensible. However, we observed no difference in activation 
for figurative targets in the metaphor and simile conditions. A possible explanation for this result 
is that the word like in similes could lead participants to anticipate an upcoming vehicle word 
that is not typically literally related to the topic of the sentence. The gating paradigm used to 
determine recognition points tested the moment at which each word is recognized in isolation, 
but context could bias listeners to correctly identify the word earlier when presented within a 
sentence. In the context of highly familiar or lexicalized similes like time is like money, the word 
like could in fact trigger an assumption in the listener that the word money will follow, due to the 
frequency with which the simile is used in common speech and writing – and cause the 




possibility, additional experiments could be conducted relating the strength of the early 
figurative priming effect to the familiarity rating of each simile. 
 Alternatively, the word like in the simile phrase could lead the listener to think about 
things that are like time, and activation could reflect this rather than the vehicle word money. 
This would be less likely to occur when hearing a metaphor because there are many more 
plausible ways to continue the sentence (e.g., the sentence time is passing would be just as likely 
as time is money). Since the norms compiled by Roncero and de Almeida (2015) contained a 
high level of overlap between explanatory words generated for each metaphor and simile 
containing the same constituents, it is possible that fast response times to targets figuratively 
related to the vehicle reflect a relationship to the topic, rather than the vehicle, of simile 
sentences. This explanation is more consistent with the smaller priming effects for figurative 
targets at later time point (b), after the full sentence has been processed.  
 It is also relevant to note that, while literal targets were generally not descriptive of both 
the topic and vehicle of experimental sentences and reflected meanings of the vehicle in 
isolation, figurative targets were necessarily related to both topic and vehicle of any given 
phrase. This could account for general early activation of figurative targets even without the 
formation of ad-hoc concepts or direct access to figurative meanings, as there was a degree of 
literal relatedness between vehicle and figurative target in many of the sentence/target pairs we 
selected from Roncero and de Almeida's (2015) published norms (see Appendix 1 for a complete 
list of sentence/target pairs). Our rationale for using these targets was that they were commonly 
generated by participants in the norming studies, and thus more likely to reflect common 
understandings of metaphor meanings than researcher-generated targets designed to be as 




of the targets in each condition, we were careful not to select targets for the figurative condition 
which participants from the norming study (Roncero & de Almeida, 2015) had named as 
associates of the vehicle word in isolation – meaning that they were not what most commonly 
comes to mind when hearing the vehicle word, and thus their access should be facilitated to a 
lesser degree (in isolation) than the corresponding literally related target.  
 A major methodological difference between our study and other psycholinguistic 
experiments employing cross-modal lexical priming (e.g., Swinney, 1979; Friedmann et al., 
2008) was our use of briefly presented masked visual targets. Typically, cross-modal lexical 
decision tasks employ an unmasked visual target presentation lasting at least 500ms (e.g. 
Friedmann et al., 2008), which allows for much higher response accuracy. In contrast, very brief 
(40-50ms) masked presentations of visual primes have mainly been employed in visual priming 
experiments where primes are morphologically or orthographically related to a visually 
presented target word (Forster, 1999). Forster (1999) explained that the use of very rapid masked 
primes should circumvent conscious thought processes about prime and target words and, 
instead, reflect unconscious processes of word association. Our use of masked visual targets 
presented for 80ms combined with presentation times at the recognition point of aurally 
presented vehicle words followed the rationale that in order to observe unconscious on-line 
access to semantically related concepts during metaphor processing, participants should not be 
allowed time to consciously consider either visual target or aurally presented vehicle. This 
created a speed-accuracy trade-off that resulted in a loss of useful data; however, the data 
obtained should be reflective of unconscious (on-line) facilitation processes.  
 In identity priming experiments (e.g., where the masked prime ###shark### primes 




for morphologically or orthographically related words are generally smaller (Forster, 1999). Our 
masked lexical decision experiment obtained a mean priming effect of 40ms (p < 0.001) for 
related targets over unrelated controls, validating that experimental targets derived from Roncero 
and de Almeida's (2015) norms were strongly related to aurally presented vehicle words. 
Although our presentation time of 80ms was double that of morphological visual masked primes 
in experiments described by Forster (1999), the priming effect observed was large considering 
that target words were not morphologically or orthographically related to their corresponding 
vehicles.  
 It is possible that this novel rapid masked target presentation did not allow for full 
semantic composition of sentences (see: de Almeida & Lepore, 2017) prior to lexical decisions at 
the early time point (a), as the very brief presentation of target words may have forced lexical 
decisions before the full meaning of each metaphor or simile could be composed. If this is the 
case, a possible interpretation of our results is that the priming observed across early-
presentation conditions reflects associations between the target word and the vehicle word in 
isolation, rather than the full sentence and its meaning. According to this interpretation, no 
difference should be observed between priming in metaphor and simile conditions, and any 
observed priming effects reflect automatic associations between the target and vehicle word. 
This interpretation is consistent with Carston's (2010) dual processing model, as associations 
between each vehicle and its corresponding figuratively related prime could reflect ad-hoc 
concepts formed by partial lexicalization of the metaphorical meaning of vehicle words used in 
the experiment, rather than an understanding that the sentence as a whole is meant to convey a 
metaphorical meaning as direct-access models suggest. Indeed, some evidence used to support 




awareness of an intended figurative meaning – are necessary to facilitate metaphor 
comprehension (e.g., Inhoff et al., 1984), while our experiment did not employ biasing contexts. 
If context was necessary to facilitate a figurative interpretation of a metaphor, we would not 
expect to observe priming in early conditions for metaphors and similes in isolation.  
Conclusions 
 Multiple competing theories have been proposed to explain the processes involved in 
attaining meaning for metaphors which cannot be understood literally. While some theorists 
consider the issue resolved in favour of the direct-access theory of metaphor comprehension (e.g. 
Glucksberg, 2003), empirical investigations have failed to provide strong evidence for either 
pragmatic or direct-access accounts (de Almeida et al., 2010). Using a novel masked brief-
presentation cross-modal lexical decision paradigm, the present thesis attempted to elucidate 
moment-by-moment cognitive processes occurring at the moment that a metaphor or simile in 
the form X is (like) Y is uttered. Results showed significant priming effects of both figuratively- 
and literally- related targets across all conditions (in metaphor and simile, at multiple time 
points), a result that we interpret as most consistent with Carston’s (2010) dual-processing 
account of metaphor, which posits that both ad-hoc figurative concepts related to metaphorical 
vehicles and literal meanings should remain activated throughout sentence comprehension. 
Future directions for this line of investigation include investigating correlations between priming 
effects and familiarity/aptness ratings of each metaphor, to elucidate whether early activations of 
figurative meanings are due to lexicalization of certain metaphors or whether they are formed 
on-line according to a metaphor’s explanatory value. While the results of our experiment do not 
provide strong evidence in favour of any particular theory of metaphor processing, they suggest 
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Experimental sentences and targets. 
Metaphor/simile Figurative target Literal target 
Genes are (like) blueprints Maps Construction 
Salesmen are (like) bulldozers Annoying Big 
Love is (like) a child Innocent Annoying 
Minds are (like) computers Intelligent Expensive 
Clouds are (like) cotton White Comfy 
Eyelids are (like) curtains Open Colourful 
Insults are (like) daggers Hurtful Blade 
Typewriters are (like) dinosaurs Antiques Dangerous 
Love is (like) a drug High Death 
Anger is (like) fire Scary Flames 
Families are (like) fortresses Strong Big 
Trust is (like) glue Binds Liquid 
Exams are (like) hurdles Stressful Height 
Jobs are (like) jails Boring Dangerous 
Cities are (like) jungles 





Music is (like) medicine Helpful Bitter 




Wisdom is (like) an ocean Vast Blue 
Beauty is (like) a passport Advantage Booklet 
Fingerprints are (like) portraits Unique Beautiful 
Faith is (like) a raft Unsteady Flat 
Friendship is (like) a rainbow Rare Curvy 
Life is (like) a river Long Blue 
Teachers are (like) sculptors Builders Clay 
Obligations are (like) shackles Annoying Heavy 
Lawyers are (like) sharks Mean Blood 
Lawyers are (like) snakes Sneaky Death 
Memory is (like) a sponge Soaking Dirty 
Education is (like) a stairway Upward Exercise 
Time is (like) a thief Quick Dangerous 
Heaven is (like) a treasure Pleasant Expensive 
 
 
 
